Indiana Journal of Law and Social
Equality
Volume 10

Issue 2

Article 5

Summer 6-30-2022

Inconsistencies in Bail Determinations: An Analysis of Judicial
Decision- Making
Kacey Henning
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, kahenni@iu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijlse
Part of the Law Commons

Publication Citation
Kacey Henning, Inconsistencies in Bail Determinations: An Analysis of Judicial Decision- Making, 10 Ind.
J.L. & Soc. Equal. 437 (2022).

This Student Note is brought to you for free and open
access by the Maurer Law Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality by an
authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For
more information, please contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

2022]

Inconsistencies in Bail Determinations

437

Inconsistencies in Bail Determinations: An Analysis of Judicial DecisionMaking
Kacey Henning*

INTRODUCTION
All across the United States, arrestees sit in jail awaiting adversarial
proceedings. These individuals, who are innocent until proven guilty, may wait days
before standing in front of a judge for their bail determination. Following the bail
decision, arrestees are often pressured to take plea deals as a result of their
inability to pay the bail amount or are forced to make the tough decision to remain
incarcerated to receive a fair shake at trial. Arbitrary bail guidelines, combined
with the lack of guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court on setting bail, has created
a rampant trend of excessive bail and, in response, a large push for bail reform.
Part I of this Note gives a backdrop on the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail
Clause and Supreme Court rulings on this clause. Part II provides insight into the
different interpretations of this clause from judges and legislators across the United
States. Part III points out the issues with the current state of bail setting in the
United States and focuses on the gray area of judicial decision-making in bail
determinations. Part IV provides possible solutions to reduce judicial bias and
mitigate the excessive bail problem.
I. BACKGROUND: THE RIGHT TO BAIL
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that “[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted” and applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 While a right to bail is not explicitly stated in the Eighth
Amendment, many scholars and courts have found this right to be implied.2 The
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause was not interpreted by the Supreme
Court until 1951.3 In Stack v. Boyle, the Court held that individuals were entitled to
bail determinations based on their particular circumstances relevant to assuring
their appearance at trial.4
Following a subsequent Supreme Court decision in Carlson v. Landon, in
which the Court muddled its earlier interpretation of the Excessive Bail Clause,5
Congress attempted to provide a clearer standard for setting bail via the Bail
*

1
2

3
4
5

J.D., 2022, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.S. Legal Studies & B.B.A Management, 2018,
Grand Valley State University.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971).
Ariana K. Connelly & Nadin R. Linthorst, The Constitutionality of Setting Bail Without Regard to Income:
Securing Justice or Social Injustice?, 10 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 115, 118 (2019).
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
Id. at 5.
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544 (1952) (stating that bail must be “in a reasonable amount”, but
providing no explanation for how to calculate this); James A. Allen, Note, “Making Bail”: Limiting the Use
of Bail Schedules and Defining the Elusive Meaning of “Excessive” Bail, 25 J.L. & POL'Y 637, 646 (2017).
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Reform Act (“BRA”) of 1966.6 The BRA established that, when setting bail, judges
should take into consideration the following:
the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the
evidence against the accused, the accused’s family ties, employment,
financial resources, character and mental condition, the length of his
residence in the community, his record of convictions, and his record
of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or
failure to appear at court proceedings.7
The BRA was later revised in 1984 to include concern for public safety as a factor
for determining bail.8
The BRA of 1984 was quickly challenged in 1986; in United States v. Salerno,
petitioners claimed the Act “was a violation of their Due Process rights and their
Eighth Amendment right to be free from the denial of bail based on considerations
other than the possibility of flight.”9 The Court ultimately held that it is permissible
for the judge in a bail determination to consider the risks of flight and public safety,
among other concerns.10 Courts have also found that bail is not available for capital
crimes, citing danger concerns as a reason for this distinction.11
While Salerno answered some lingering questions regarding the right to bail,
the case failed to adequately delve into the issue of when pretrial detention would
become “excessive.”12 This uncertainty produced the issue with bail-setting that
exists today, as courts moved away from an “implied right to pretrial release” and
toward the use of arbitrary and more restrictive bail conditions on defendants.13
II. BAIL DETERMINATION PROCESSES ACROSS JURISDICTIONS
The process of determining bail amounts persists as an extremely important
step in the criminal justice system, as bail is the one device that governs the release
or detention of defendants before trial.14 It is imperative that judges get bail
determinations right, as getting it wrong could produce serious risks.15 Some of
these concerns include preventing or postponing justice; endangering society or

6
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Id. at 648.
Id. (quoting Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-465 § 3146, 80 Stat. 214).
Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 3142(b), 98 Stat. 1976, 1977 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3142).
Allen, supra note 5, at 649 (citing Brief for Respondent at 1–3, U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S 739 (1987) (No. 8687)).
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754–55 (1987).
Connelly & Linthorst, supra note 2, at 120–21.
See Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987); Allen, supra note 5, at 652.
Id. at 652–53.
John S. Goldkamp & Michael R. Gottfredson, Bail Decision Making and Pretrial Detention: Surfacing
Judicial Policy, 3 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 227, 228 (1979).
Peter B. Krupp, A Call for More Focused Advocacy: Setting Bail After Brangan, 61 BOS. BAR J. (Feb. 2,
2018), https://bostonbarjournal.com/2018/02/02/a-call-for-more-focused-advocacy-setting-bail-after-brangan/.
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creating a public risk by releasing a violent or unstable defendant; and creating
lasting, negative effects on the defendant if an unaffordable bail is set.16
Existing laws and guidelines surrounding the use of bail as a pretrial
detention device areused inconsistently from state to state.17 In some states, bail
schedules are used in an attempt to standardize bail determinations.18 Bail
schedules, sometimes referred to as bail schemes, are
procedural schemes that provide judges with standardized money bail
amounts based upon the offense charged, regardless of the
characteristics of an individual defendant. These schedules might
formally be promulgated through state law, or informally employed by
local officials. They may be mandatory or merely advisory, and may
provide minimum sums, maximum sums, or a range of sums to be
imposed for each crime.19
While these bail systems are quick and easy to use, they have been unsuccessful in
providing more even-handed bail determinations.20 Instead, bail schedules have
worked to strengthen a “wealth-based detention system”21 that results “in a greater
adverse impact on indigent individuals.”22
In other states, guidance for judges in setting bail consists of nothing more
than the requirement of the right to bail or a list of factors to be considered.23 Bail
determinations here are left to judicial discretion, leaving judges to weigh different
subjective conditions to determine a defendant’s risk of flight and risk to public
safety.24 The criteria considered in these states often include the following:
(1) the nature of the current charge; (2) the weight of the evidence and
the likelihood of conviction; the possible criminal penalty; (3) the
defendant's prior criminal history (including in three states, juvenile
history); (4) prior record of appearance in court; (5) whether the
defendant was on probation, parole or pretrial release in connection
with an earlier offense; (6) age; (7) length of residence in, and ties to
the community; (8) employment; (9) financial resources; (10)
character, reputation and mental condition; (11) past general conduct;

16
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Id.
Allen, supra note 5, at 655.
Id. at 665.
Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, 26 CRIM. JUST. 12, 13 (2011).
See Allen, supra note 5, at 664–65.
Id. at 665 (quoting Odonnell v. Harris Cty., No. H-16-1414, 2017 WL 1735456, at *63 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28,
2017) (internal quotations omitted)).
Id. at 656.
John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8–9 (1985).
See id. at 8–10; Muhammad B. Sardar, Give Me Liberty or Give Me . . . Alternatives? Ending Cash Bail and
Its Impact on Pretrial Incarceration, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1434 (2019).
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(12) the availability of persons to assist the person in attending court;
and (13) whether the person is an alcoholic or a drug addict.25
With this type of ambiguous bail analysis, inconsistencies arise as judges are free to
ignore whichever factors they deem unnecessary and can instead focus solely on the
defendant’s current charge and criminal record.26 Combined with the diverging
views on the purpose of bail, some judges use their discretion as a method of
detention, assigning bail at a “level deliberately beyond the defendant’s likely
ability to afford it.”27
Beyond inconsistent methods for setting bail, the types of bond and
additional pretrial conditions allowed vary from location to location.28 The most
typical types of bond are (1) cash bonds, where the defendant must pay the full
amount of their bail prior to being released; (2) surety bonds, where a bail
bondsman posts the bond for the defendant in exchange for a certain premium or
collateral; (3) property bonds, where a claim is placed on property; and (4) personal
recognizance bonds where no form of cash bail is required and defendants are
released on the promise that they will return for future proceedings.29 Some state
laws reference conditions that may be set in addition to money bail or recognizance
bonds to reduce the defendant’s risk to the public or of flight.30 These additional
conditions can include the following:
(1) custody by a pretrial services or other public agency; (2) custody to
a third party or organization; (3) regular reporting to or supervision
by a pretrial services, probation or law enforcement agency; (4)
restrictions on residence, travel, associations and activities; (5)
prohibitions against possessing weapons, alcohol or drug usage; (6)
requirements that employment be found or maintained, that
educational or vocational programs be initiated or continued; (7)
requirements that a defendant participate in counseling, drug or
alcohol treatment programs; and (8) part-time custody.31
These conditions can be very useful to judges as they help to strike a balance
between the concerns about public safety and the risk of flight while ensuring an
arrestee is not unnecessarily detained pretrial.32 Additional conditions are not
currently being used in this way, however, and cash bail continues to be prevalent.33

25
26
27
28
29

30
31
32
33

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 12–13.
See Clive Johnson, Different Types of Bail Explained, UNDERSTANDING BAIL BONDS,
https://understandingbailbonds.com/different-types-bail/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2020).
Goldkamp, supra note 23, at 12.
Id. at 13.
See Connelly & Linthorst, supra note 2, at 150–51.
See Liana M. Goff, Note, Pricing Justice: The Wasteful Enterprise of America’s Bail System, 82 BROOK L.
REV. 881, 903 (2017).
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This persistent reliance on a cash bail system presents most defendants with
two options: post the entire bail amount (an impossible barrier for poor defendants)
or use a commercial bail bondsman to pay the bail amount.34 Bail bonds companies,
typically centered in “low-income communities of color,” contract with defendants to
pay their bail amount and often use deceptive and predatory practices.35 The
process typically involves a defendant paying a nonrefundable percentage of the
total bail to a bail bonds company, “which then writes a bond for the full bail
amount promising that it will be paid if the person doesn’t appear for court.”36
This guarded process leads to many continued issues for defendants and their
support system since many defendants must rely on their family and friends to both
come up with the money and contract with the bail bondsman.37 These issues
include losing the money they have provided to the bail-bonds company and
continuing to owe loan installments and fees long after the resolution of the
defendant’s case.38 Additionally, if the defendant does not appear at trial, it becomes
the bondsman’s burden to locate the defendant and return them to custody.39 If the
bail bonds company is unsuccessful in locating the defendant, “it becomes liable to
the court for the whole amount; faced with the prospect of lost profits, bondsmen
turn to the individuals who signed the bond, and ‘take whatever actions are
necessary to recover their costs.’”40 This provides bail bonds companies with an
inordinate amount of power over the justice for—and freedom of—low-income
defendants, directly in opposition to due process protections that exist to ensure the
“equitable administration of justice.”41
A. State-Specific Litigation and Legislation
California’s bail-setting procedure incorporates bail schedules.42 “These bail
schedules typically provide a maximum bail amount, but do not assign minimums,
leaving the final assigned amount to the judicial officer’s discretion.”43 To add
further ambiguities in setting bail, one California court of appeals held that a
defendant may not be imprisoned due to poverty and that “rigorous procedural
34
35

36

37
38
39
40

41
42
43

See id. at 892.
Mallory Harmon, Unconvicted and Behind Bars: The Discriminatory Nature of Cash Bail, SHARED JUSTICE
(July 31, 2019), http://www.sharedjustice.org/domestic-justice/unconvicted-and-behind-bars.
Id. (quoting Gillian B. White, Who Really Makes Money Off of Bail Bonds?, ATLANTIC (May 12, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/05/bail-bonds/526542/ (internal quotations omitted)).
See id.
See id.
Goff, supra note 33, at 902.
Id. (quoting Tracy Velázquez, Melissa Neal & Spike Bradford, Bailing on Justice: The Dysfunctional System
of Using Money to Buy Pretrial Freedom, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Nov. 15, 2012),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2012/nov/15/bailing-on-justice-the-dysfunctional-system-of-usingmoney-to-buy-pretrial-freedom/.
Id. at 903–04.
Allen, supra note 5, at 658; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275 (West 2016).
Id.
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safeguards” should be used to ensure that any determination on the defendant’s
dangerousness or risk of flight is accurate.44 In an attempt to resolve the state’s
muddled and inconsistent bail system, a proposition was on the ballot in the 2020
election cycle that would replace the cash bail system.45 This proposition included a
law establishing a risk assessment structure designed to determine whether a
defendant should be released and, if so, on what conditions.46 This proposition was
opposed by many bail reform groups, including the ACLU, as they claimed this
proposed process gave judges too much discretion and was susceptible to racial
bias.47 The citizens of California ultimately did not pass this proposition, leaving
bail reform activists back at square one in the state.48
In 2021, cash bail reform was considered once again by the California
Supreme Court in In re Humphrey.49 There, the court held that California’s cash
bail practices were unconstitutional and that California state courts must consider
less restrictive alternatives to detention.50 Additionally, the court reiterated United
States Supreme Court precedent in United States v. Salerno that “liberty is the
norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
exception.”51 While this was a great step forward for California defendants, the
ruling left many unanswered questions as it did not provide a clear bail
determination process.52
In Texas, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in ODonnell v.
Harris County held that Harris County’s procedure for setting bail without
individual assessment violated the Equal Protection Clause and that judges must
consider monetary resources when setting cash bail.53 The court held that Harris
County’s procedures resulted in “an absolute deprivation” of the defendant’s “most
basic liberty interests—freedom from incarceration.”54 Following this case, the
county entered into a consent decree with the plaintiffs.55 This case, however, was
overturned by Daves v. Dallas County in 2022 on abstention grounds without
44
45

46
47

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
Taryn A. Merkl & Leily Arzy, California’s Referendum to Eliminate Cash Bail, Explained, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/californias-referendumeliminate-cash-bail-explained.
Id.
Patrick McGreevy, Prop. 25, Which Would Have Abolished California’s Cash Bail System, is Rejected by
Voters, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020, 8:49 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-11-03/2020california-election-prop-25-results.
Id.
Humprey, 482 P.3d at 1012 (2021).
Id. at 1012–13.
Id. at 1021 (quoting U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)) (internal quotations omitted)).
See id. at 1021–22.
ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 161 (5th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 162.
Andrew Schneider & Paul DeBenedetto, The Bail Bond Industry Hopes a Recent Court Ruling Kills Harris
County’s Reforms. Supporters Don’t See That Happening, HOUS. PUB. MEDIA (Jan. 17, 2022, 6:00 AM),
https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/criminal-justice/2022/01/17/417173/a-federal-appealscourt-ruling-may-endanger-harris-countys-misdemeanor-bail-reform-settlement/.
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reaching the excessive bail issue.56 Because this case did not address the
constitutionality of bail-setting procedures, it is unclear how Daves v. Dallas County
will impact the consent decree in the ODonnell case, making bail-setting waters
murky once again in Texas.57
Additionally, in Holland v. Rosen, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that there is no federal constitutional right to monetary bail.58 Here, the court was
not persuaded by the petitioner’s argument that the Eighth Amendment required
the least restrictive release condition available and reiterated that for bail
conditions to violate the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, they must
be “excessive in light of the perceived evil.”59
In New York, legislation surrounding bail initially looked promising to
combat the issue of excessive bail as “[c]ourts are mandated to consider factors such
as a defendant's employment status and financial resources, criminal record, and
record of non-appearances in court.”60 This law has not been effective, however, as
judges continue neglecting to consider financial resources of the accused and
pretrial detention numbers remain high.61
Similarly, in Brangan v. Commonwealth, a Massachusetts case, the court
“collected and clearly articulated the foundational principles underlying bail, recentering judges and advocates on what matters and what does not.”62 In this
decision, the court stressed the importance of an individualized bail decision
requiring the judge to set bail at an amount sensibly calculated to ensure the
defendant returns to court.63 While this court decision gave some clarity to the
Commonwealth, lawyers’ difficulty in obtaining adequate preparation before bail
determination hearings continues to hurt arrestees.64 Without appropriate
documentation on the defendant’s monetary position, mental health status, and
prior court experiences, the court is unable to perform a well-rounded inquiry when
determining bail.65
While all of these outcomes are examples of courts and legislatures looking to
clarify the standards for setting bail, the different conclusions only add layers of
complexity to the bail determination issue. The lack of bright-line rules leaves
judges to either follow problematic bail schedules or to draw from their own
individual experiences and biases when setting a bail amount they find reasonable.

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Daves v. Dallas County, 22 F.4th 522 (5th Cir. 2022).
Schneider & DeBenedetto, supra note 55.
Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 278–79 (3d Cir. 2018).
Id. at 291 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754 (1987) (internal quotations omitted)).
Connelly & Linthorst, supra note 2, at 145; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1)(a) (McKinney 2020).
See Connelly & Linthorst, supra note 2, at 145–46.
Krupp, supra note 15, at 3 (summarizing Brangan v. Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949 (Mass. 2017)).
Id.
See id. at 4–5.
See id.
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III. CURRENT ISSUES WITH TODAY’S BAIL DETERMINATION INCONSISTENCIES
A. Inconsistency with Due Process
The current bail-setting atmosphere is concerning for multiple reasons. First,
pretrial detention seems to be inconsistent with the due process principle that
individuals are innocent until proven guilty.66 As a factor to determine bail
amounts, judges are expected to evaluate a defendant’s risk to the public.67
Oftentimes, the limited information judges have to evaluate whether defendants are
dangerous is the current record of the crime, of which they have not yet been found
guilty; past convictions; court records; and basic identifying information.68 This
essentially forces a judge to shortcut due process and act as a fact-finder of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged crime.69
Second, after deciding that a cash bail is necessary, in jurisdictions without
bail schedules, judges choose arbitrary amounts using their own subjective factors.70
This process could in fact trigger discrimination of a defendant before trial
depending on the defendant’s monetary resources.71 For example, consider two
defendants: Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 both commit the same crime at the same
place, and all circumstances are identical except for the Defendants’ monetary
resources. Defendant 1 works full-time at a factory and lives in the suburbs,
whereas Defendant 2 is unemployed and homeless. If a judge were to make a cash
bail determination of $5,000 using a bail schedule or other factors with no regard to
monetary resources—as judges often do—Defendant 1 would likely be able to afford
this amount. Defendant 1 would be released from jail pending trial and could
resume his life as usual. Defendant 2, on the other hand, would not be able to post
bail. Instead, Defendant 2 would internalize the social cost of being incarcerated
and be pressured to take a less favorable plea bargain.72 In effect, judges that find
defendants suitable for cash bail but do not consider multiple factors, including
defendants’ financial situations, can effectively deny release altogether.73
B. Judicial Decision Making and Social Psychology
With the lack of direction and law, how are judges currently making these
bail determinations? This question may be answered using social psychological
concepts such as judgment heuristics, naïve realism, affective states, and implicit
bias.
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Goldkamp & Gottfredson, supra note 14, at 228.
See id. at 229, 247.
See Goldkamp, supra note 23, at 9.
See Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO STATE L.J. 723, 754 (2011).
Allen, supra note 5, at 654–55, 661.
See Goldkamp & Gottfredson, supra note 14, at 228.
Goff, supra note 33, at 900.
See Connelly & Linthorst, supra note 2, at 128.
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Availability, representativeness, and affect heuristics all likely come into play
when a judge considers factors relevant to setting bail. Availability is the idea that
an individual evaluates “the likelihood of an event by . . . recall[ing] examples of
similar instances.”74 Judges may think of previous cases they have had where
similar crimes were alleged and set bail solely on what was done before.
Representativeness is the idea that a person makes a judgment on the probability
that a person, object, or event belongs to a specific category.75 Judges may use
representativeness when assessing a defendant’s risk to safety based solely on
whether that defendant matches the judge’s idea of a dangerous person. Affect
heuristic occurs when an individual makes a judgment based on emotional gut
instinct.76 A judge may estimate a defendant’s risk to safety founded on the judge’s
emotional response to the alleged crime or gut feeling about the defendant standing
in front of them in court.
Additionally, naïve realism and false consensus likely also shape a judge’s
determination when setting bail. Naïve realism is the idea that we fail to grasp how
much our opinions are affected by our own knowledge and expectations and instead
believe that we see things as they really are.77 Naïve realism has many
implications, including the false consensus effect or the feeling that others would
see the same if they were attentive and rational individuals.78 False consensus also
causes individuals to overestimate the commonness of their perspectives and
reactions.79 Accordingly, individuals believe their decisions are standard and less
indicative of their own beliefs and influences.80 Judges likely are influenced by
these phenomena when justifying their bail determinations. To these judges, their
ultimate bail determination is a reasonable choice, regardless of the circumstances
that led them to make this decision. These judges are also more likely to justify
their decisions as typical for their court or jurisdiction and fail to appreciate how
much their determinations are influenced by their own experiences and beliefs.
A judge’s emotional state or mood may also sway the way the judge makes
their determinations. A study on Israeli judges showed that judges became more
disengaged in the decision-making process when making repetitive rulings, stating
that “when judges make repeated rulings, they show an increased tendency to rule
in favor of the status quo.”81 This tendency to follow the default was minimized

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS 72–73 (2012).
Id. at 73.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 21.
See id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 6889, 6889, 6892 (2011).
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when judges had recently taken a break and eaten a meal, suggesting that outside
factors that affect judges’ moods can influence the way they make decisions.82
Further, studies show that individuals’ moods can change their perceptions
and judgments consistent with the mood they are experiencing, known as the mood
congruency effect.83 Moods, in general, can also change the information judges pay
attention to and recall.84 Individuals experiencing positive moods generally recall
more positive information, known as affect-congruent recall, that results in more
positive and lenient judgments.85 Conversely, those experiencing negative moods
recall more negative information and have a pessimistic view on past and future
events, leading to more critical judgments.86 The lack of direction provided to judges
in making bail determinations leaves a wide space for judges’ determinations to be
influenced by ever-changing moods and emotions.
Stereotyping and biases also pervade judicial decisions. Racial biases can
affect decisions even when actors are intentionally trying to avoid being biased.87
The Implicit Association Test (“IAT”), developed to demonstrate implicit bias and
stereotypes, has been researched and published in more than one hundred academic
studies showing that implicit, or unconscious, bias exists.88 This test can be done in
many forms but typically works by presenting participants with a sorting task
requiring the participants to pair words with good or bad associations and black and
white faces.89 Results from these studies have overwhelmingly discovered that
white participants display a “white preference,” associating white faces with
positive words and Black faces with negative words.90
To better understand how the bias exposed by IATs affects the criminal
justice system, a study was performed looking at judges’ IAT scores and the way
their biases affect their decisions.91 This study found that judges, like everyone else,
hold implicit biases about race and that those biases can affect their decisions.92 The
study also found that judges were able to minimize this bias when they were aware
of a need to.93 These results demonstrate the necessity for judges to both
understand their biases and work to minimize how their baises can affect judicial
outcomes.
82
83
84
85
86
87

88

89

90
91
92
93

See id. at 6892.
ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 74, at 50.
See id.
Id.
Id.
B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 287, 288 (2006).
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1200-01 (2009).
Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV.
945, 952–53 (2006).
Rachlinski et al., supra note 88, at 1199–1200.
See id. at 1207–08.
See id.
See id. at 1221.
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In another implicit bias study, participants were flashed human faces before
being shown photos of both guns and hand tools.94 Participants were told to identify
the item flashed and to ignore the faces shown.95 The results showed a “weapon
bias,” as white participants distinguished guns faster for Black faces than for
white.96 This demonstrates that the influence of bias can still exist even when
individuals are working to restrain their biases. Even if judges intend to use
unbiased criteria to make their decisions regarding a defendant’s risk, biases may
still persist in their decisions, especially when making these determinations quickly
on the bench without looking to all available information.
Research on priming also confirms that racial stereotypes can become
activated quickly and easily by using specific words. In a criminal justice-related
priming study, police officers and probation officers were primed by flashing sets of
words at the participants, one set of which contained words associated with African
American people and one set with a nonracial context.97 The participants were then
shown two crime reports and asked to make judgments on the reports.98 Results
showed that participants primed with the African American-related set of words
made tougher judgments on the hypothetical crimes.99
Courtrooms and judges are not immune from the stereotypes and biases
shown in these studies. The lack of information available to and considered by
judges when making bail determinations reinforces these stereotypes and leaves
room for biases, a concept judges cannot avoid even if consciously attempting to. To
combat this complex concern, it is imperative that the Supreme Court of the United
States and legislatures set a clear bail-setting process that ensures judges take into
account an individual’s ability to pay, along with other factors to minimize biases, in
alignment with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. But until then, judges
must acknowledge that this bail inconsistency exists and work to override
stereotypes and biases.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO CURE BAIL DETERMINATION INCONSISTENCIES AND
REDUCE BIAS
A. Judicial Testing, Training, and Auditing
One possible step in the right direction for curbing judicial bias in bail
decisions and other determinations is to provide benchmark testing. Before taking
judicial office, judges could be administered IATs or similar tests to helpt the judges
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examine and confront their biases.100 Results of these tests could help new judges to
tangibly see their biases and make them aware of the need to actively work against
their biases when making decisions from the bench.101 IAT results could also
provide better insight into the types of bias training needed for judges.102
Diversity training for judges could also be a useful starting point in changing
a court’s culture.103 When court leadership, and the court system as a whole,
supports an egalitarian culture, others in the court system will be influenced to do
so as well, and implicit bias will be reduced.104 Specifically, this diversity training
should move away from the color-blind approach that ignores race in an attempt to
reduce bias and instead move toward a sensitivity approach that acknowledges and
appreciates differences in individuals.105 This training should be a part of a broader
diversity and inclusion strategy accompanied by an actual change in the policies
and operations of the court system to help facilitate and sustain change beyond the
judge’s own goodwill.106
Court systems could also implement auditing programs to evaluate the
existence of biases in judgments. For example, an auditor could provide data on a
judge’s patterns in bail-setting or other discretionary determinations to increase
judges’ accountability107 and highlight areas where legislatures could provide more
guidance in the courtroom. Instituting impartial “feedback mechanisms can be
powerful tools in promoting more egalitarian attitudes” and equal judgments from
judges as they “could prompt those with egalitarian motives to do more to prevent
implicit bias in future decisions and actions.”108 This feedback should come from a
legitimate authority and provide tangible recommendations to improve the judge’s
decision-making process.109 It is also important that the audit be non-threatening as
coercive pressure can provoke opposition from some individuals and lead to
counterproductive outcomes.110
B. Bail Algorithms
Bail algorithms, or computer programs designed to determine appropriate
bail amounts based on objective factors, could be a step in the right direction to
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limit excessive bail and curb judicial biases.111 These programs often work to
understand the defendant’s likelihood to flee or reoffend by asking questions about
the defendant’s criminal history and personal background.112 This new process for
setting bail is not without fault, though, as some scholars have criticized the
programs for the types of factors taken into account and the negative consequences
that may develop from their use.113 For example, in 2014, Eric Holder, then the U.S.
Attorney General, voiced his concerns regarding bail algorithms, stating:
[a]lthough these [risk assessment] measures were crafted with the
best of intentions, I am concerned that they may inadvertently
undermine our efforts to ensure individualized and equal justice . . . .
exacerbat[ing] unwarranted and unjust disparities that are already
far too common in our criminal justice system and in our society.114
Conversely, with advanced artificial intelligence, algorithm programs could work
without incorporating bias.115 It is possible to create a computer algorithm program
that follows a process without deviation and discards all irrelevant factors.116 This
type of program could “prevent socio-economic disadvantaged offenders or offenders
of different races from suffering harsher penalties.”117 Theoretically, achieving this
goal would be far easier when relying on computers than when relying on human
judgment, as we often do now for bail determinations.118 Bail algorithms could also
“decrease[] the . . . power the bail bonding industry has over defendants” by
bringing the administration of justice for these defendants “back into the scope of
the public justice system.”119
The success of bail algorithms, however, lies within the details used in their
creation. If these algorithms incorporate societal biases and inequalities in the data
used to make predictions, these programs would make it even more likely for biases
to be exacerbated and emerge in decisions.120 Factors need not be explicitly biased
to produce discriminatory results as “[b]ias may result from pretrial release factors
serving as proxies for other criteria.”121 For example, asking a defendant whether
they have a working cellphone is not inherently prejudicial but could serve as a
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proxy for poverty.122 The potential bias that could be perpetuated by using bail
algorithms can be limited, however, by ensuring that the software itself is free from
biased proxies.123 This can be done through extensive testing to find patterns of
false categorization of defendants.124
While bail algorithms are not yet a perfect solution to the excessive bail
problem, courts’ willingness to use algorithm “recommendations . . . in conjunction
with their own experience and understanding of the law” when making bail
determinations could be a vital step toward increasing the usefulness of these
algorithms.125 As technology develops, algorithms receive more data and bias is
removed from the process,126 bail algorithms could become a sustainable and
faultless process for making equal bail determinations.
C. Pretrial Services
Pretrial Service Agencies (PSAs) are arguably the most successful bail reform
technique currently available. These governmental agencies work as aids to judges
and attorneys by providing a case-by-case analysis of defendants after conducting
interviews and risk assessments.127 PSAs have historically led to more accurate bail
determinations, reduced the issue of excessive bail, and even “lowered the cost of
pretrial inmate detention.”128
PSAs can provide an outside perspective, making predictions based on past
similar cases and circumstances.129 Outside third-party perspectives are especially
useful to make more accurate and consistent judgments, as third parties are more
objective about situations and naturally “take the outside view.”130 Additionally,
expert third parties are in the best position to draw on past experience to improve
accuracy.131 Using the average of multiple individual predictions or determinations,
known as the “wisdom of crowds,” ultimately leads to improved judgments132 and
could be applied evenly across bail determinations by PSAs.
Full implementation of PSAs as intended would simplify bail determinations
by identifying conditions appropriate for each arrestee and would also better
identify arrestees who cannot be safely released on any conditions.133 To do this,
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Congress should hold oversight hearings on the Act establishing PSAs.134 Oversight
hearings could provide valuable data necessary to determine how to allocate funds
to carry out quality PSA performance.135 States should also consider creating a
standard use of PSAs in order to benefit from higher trial appearance rates, lower
pretrial detention costs, and ensure that excessive bail amounts are not imposed.
D. Supreme Court Involvement
As noted in Part III.B, states and jurisdictions have all been left to their own
devices in determining the best strategy for setting bail, lacking clarity from
Supreme Court decisions.136 Litigation continues in an attempt to push for more
progressive bail reform and define the meaning of the Excessive Bail Clause.137
While all of this is being sorted out, defendants unable to post bail are either left
sitting in jail awaiting trial or turn to bail lenders, who typically lend on highly
unfavorable terms. Without a well-defined Supreme Court ruling laying out the
parameters on excessive bail, “courts throughout the country will continue to
interpret this clause arbitrarily at worst, and inconsistently at best.”138
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari in an excessive bail case to
provide updated guidance on the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause. The
Court should rule that bail schedules and similar bail-setting procedures are a
violation of the Eighth Amendment under Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Stack v.
Boyle, in which he declared that it was a clear violation of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 46(c) if a court “fixed a uniform blanket bail” based on the “nature of the
accusation” and without considering “the difference in circumstances between
different defendants.”139 Instead, the Court should require a process similar to the
PSA system to determine what constitutes excessive bail on an independent basis
and to limit judicial bias. Among other factors, an arrestee’s financial situation
should be a required consideration in any bail determination analysis.
CONCLUSION
The meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause has shifted
throughout time. That shifting has created a mess in the bail-setting process.
Historically, bail was “simply meant to ensure a defendant’s appearance at trial and
maintain his liberty interests prior to.”140 We have since gone away from this
meaning as a country and instead have started a practice of using bail to keep
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indigent defendants detained before trial.141 The cause of this shift could be drawn
from many changes in bail legislation and a push to be tougher on crime but
ultimately is made worse by the lack of direction from the Supreme Court and
inconsistent processes from court to court.142
This lack of uniformity in guidelines often leaves judges to create their own
decision-making processes for setting bail.143 Different life experiences and biases of
these judges coupled with the arbitrary factors considered result in inconsistent and
unconstitutional bail determinations.144 To address this issue, states should work to
minimize the impact of judges’ individual biases on their decisions and adopt
holistic bail setting procedures such as PSAs. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
should hand down a definitive interpretation of the Eighth Amendment Excessive
Bail Clause.
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